Mm 66813 sso callback metadata (#34955) (#35383)

Automatic Merge

api/v4/source/users.yaml

@@ -76,13 +76,15 @@
           $ref: "#/components/responses/Forbidden"
   /api/v4/users/login/sso/code-exchange:
     post:
+      deprecated: true
       tags:
         - users
       summary: Exchange SSO login code for session tokens
       description: >
         Exchange a short-lived login_code for session tokens using SAML code exchange (mobile SSO flow).
-        This endpoint is part of the mobile SSO code-exchange flow to prevent tokens 
-        from appearing in deep links.
+
+        **Deprecated:** This endpoint is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
+        Mobile clients should use the direct SSO callback flow instead.
 
         ##### Permissions
 

server/channels/api4/user.go

@@ -113,12 +113,28 @@ func (api *API) InitUser() {
 	api.BaseRoutes.Users.Handle("/trigger-notify-admin-posts", api.APISessionRequired(handleTriggerNotifyAdminPosts)).Methods(http.MethodPost)
 }
 
-// loginSSOCodeExchange exchanges a short-lived login_code for session tokens (mobile SAML code exchange)
+// loginSSOCodeExchange exchanges a short-lived login_code for session tokens.
+//
+// Deprecated: This endpoint is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
+// Mobile clients should use the direct SSO callback flow instead.
 func loginSSOCodeExchange(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	// Set deprecation headers to inform clients
+	w.Header().Set("Deprecation", "true")
+
 	if !c.App.Config().FeatureFlags.MobileSSOCodeExchange {
-		c.Err = model.NewAppError("loginSSOCodeExchange", "api.oauth.get_access_token.bad_request.app_error", nil, "feature disabled", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		c.Logger.Warn("Deprecated endpoint called",
+			mlog.String("endpoint", "/login/sso/code-exchange"),
+			mlog.String("status", "disabled"),
+		)
+		c.Err = model.NewAppError("loginSSOCodeExchange", "api.user.login_sso_code_exchange.deprecated.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusGone)
 		return
 	}
+
+	c.Logger.Warn("Deprecated endpoint called",
+		mlog.String("endpoint", "/login/sso/code-exchange"),
+		mlog.String("status", "enabled but deprecated"),
+	)
+
 	props := model.MapFromJSON(r.Body)
 	loginCode := props["login_code"]
 	codeVerifier := props["code_verifier"]

server/channels/api4/user_test.go

@@ -8856,16 +8856,34 @@ func TestLoginWithDesktopToken(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+func TestLoginSSOCodeExchangeDeprecated(t *testing.T) {
+	mainHelper.Parallel(t)
+	th := SetupConfig(t, func(cfg *model.Config) {
+		cfg.FeatureFlags.MobileSSOCodeExchange = false
+	}).InitBasic()
+
+	props := map[string]string{
+		"login_code":    "test_code",
+		"code_verifier": "test_verifier",
+		"state":         "test_state",
+	}
+
+	resp, err := th.Client.DoAPIPost(context.Background(), "/users/login/sso/code-exchange", model.MapToJSON(props))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusGone, resp.StatusCode)
+	assert.Equal(t, "true", resp.Header.Get("Deprecation"))
+}
+
+// TestLoginSSOCodeExchange tests the code-exchange endpoint when enabled via feature flag.
+// Note: This endpoint is deprecated and disabled by default. These tests verify behavior
+// when explicitly enabled via feature flag (for backwards compatibility during rollout).
 func TestLoginSSOCodeExchange(t *testing.T) {
 	mainHelper.Parallel(t)
-	th := Setup(t).InitBasic()
-	defer th.TearDown()
+	th := SetupConfig(t, func(cfg *model.Config) {
+		cfg.FeatureFlags.MobileSSOCodeExchange = true
+	}).InitBasic()
 
 	t.Run("wrong token type cannot be used for code exchange", func(t *testing.T) {
-		th.App.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
-			cfg.FeatureFlags.MobileSSOCodeExchange = true
-		})
-
 		token := model.NewToken(model.TokenTypeOAuth, "extra-data")
 		require.NoError(t, th.App.Srv().Store().Token().Save(token))
 		defer func() {
@@ -8884,10 +8902,6 @@ func TestLoginSSOCodeExchange(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	t.Run("successful code exchange with S256 challenge", func(t *testing.T) {
-		th.App.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
-			cfg.FeatureFlags.MobileSSOCodeExchange = true
-		})
-
 		samlUser := th.CreateUserWithAuth(model.UserAuthServiceSaml)
 
 		codeVerifier := "test_code_verifier_123456789"

server/channels/web/oauth.go

@@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ func completeOAuth(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			redirectURL = utils.AppendQueryParamsToURL(redirectURL, map[string]string{
 				model.SessionCookieToken: c.AppContext.Session().Token,
 				model.SessionCookieCsrf:  c.AppContext.Session().GetCSRF(),
+				"srv":                    c.App.GetSiteURL(), // Server URL for mobile client verification
 			})
 			utils.RenderMobileAuthComplete(w, redirectURL)
 

server/channels/web/oauth_test.go

@@ -859,6 +859,59 @@ func (th *TestHelper) AddPermissionToRole(permission string, roleName string) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestOAuthMobileCallbackIncludesSrvParameter verifies that mobile OAuth callbacks
+// include the 'srv' parameter for origin verification
+func TestOAuthMobileCallbackIncludesSrvParameter(t *testing.T) {
+	// The 'srv' parameter is added to mobile callbacks to allow the client
+	// to verify the server origin
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter should be included in mobile callback URL construction", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Verify the pattern: when we construct a redirect URL for mobile OAuth,
+		// it should include "srv" parameter with the server's site URL
+
+		siteURL := "https://mattermost.example.com"
+		sessionToken := "test-session-token"
+		csrfToken := "test-csrf-token"
+
+		// Simulate what the code does when constructing the callback
+		params := map[string]string{
+			model.SessionCookieToken: sessionToken,
+			model.SessionCookieCsrf:  csrfToken,
+			"srv":                    siteURL,
+		}
+
+		// Verify all expected parameters are present
+		assert.Equal(t, sessionToken, params[model.SessionCookieToken])
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, params[model.SessionCookieCsrf])
+		assert.Equal(t, siteURL, params["srv"])
+	})
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter detects OAuth server mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Scenario: The srv parameter from callback doesn't match expected server
+		// Mobile should detect the mismatch
+
+		expectedServer := "https://server-a.example.com"
+		actualSrvFromCallback := "https://server-b.example.com"
+
+		// This is the check that should happen in mobile
+		isMismatch := expectedServer != actualSrvFromCallback
+		assert.True(t, isMismatch, "Should detect server mismatch")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter allows legitimate OAuth login", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Scenario: Normal OAuth login to legitimate.com
+		// Server adds srv=legitimate.com to callback
+		// Mobile verifies: expected (legitimate.com) == srv (legitimate.com)
+
+		expectedServer := "https://legitimate.example.com"
+		actualSrvFromCallback := "https://legitimate.example.com"
+
+		// This is the check that should happen in mobile
+		isLegitimate := expectedServer == actualSrvFromCallback
+		assert.True(t, isLegitimate, "Should allow legitimate OAuth login")
+	})
+}
+
 func TestFullyQualifiedRedirectURL(t *testing.T) {
 	const siteURL = "https://xxx.yyy/mm"
 

server/channels/web/saml.go

@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ func completeSaml(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 		redirectURL = utils.AppendQueryParamsToURL(redirectURL, map[string]string{
 			"login_code": code.Token,
+			"srv":        c.App.GetSiteURL(), // Server URL for mobile client verification
 		})
 		utils.RenderMobileAuthComplete(w, redirectURL)
 		return
@@ -281,13 +282,12 @@ func completeSaml(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if hasRedirectURL {
 		if isMobile {
 			// Mobile clients with redirect url support
-			// Legacy mobile path: return tokens only when SAML code exchange was not requested
-			if samlChallenge == "" {
-				redirectURL = utils.AppendQueryParamsToURL(redirectURL, map[string]string{
-					model.SessionCookieToken: c.AppContext.Session().Token,
-					model.SessionCookieCsrf:  c.AppContext.Session().GetCSRF(),
-				})
-			}
+			// Always add tokens for mobile in legacy path (we only reach here if code-exchange was skipped)
+			redirectURL = utils.AppendQueryParamsToURL(redirectURL, map[string]string{
+				model.SessionCookieToken: c.AppContext.Session().Token,
+				model.SessionCookieCsrf:  c.AppContext.Session().GetCSRF(),
+				"srv":                    c.App.GetSiteURL(), // Server URL for mobile client verification (config-based, not request Host)
+			})
 			utils.RenderMobileAuthComplete(w, redirectURL)
 		} else {
 			http.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusFound)

server/channels/web/saml_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2015-present Mattermost, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+// See LICENSE.txt for license information.
+
+package web
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/public/model"
+)
+
+// TestSamlCallbackIncludesSrvParameter verifies that mobile SAML callbacks
+// include the 'srv' parameter for origin verification
+func TestSamlCallbackIncludesSrvParameter(t *testing.T) {
+	// The 'srv' parameter is added to mobile callbacks to allow the client
+	// to verify the server origin
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter should be included in redirect URL construction", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Verify the pattern: when we construct a redirect URL for mobile,
+		// it should include "srv" parameter with the server's site URL
+
+		siteURL := "https://mattermost.example.com"
+		sessionToken := "test-session-token"
+		csrfToken := "test-csrf-token"
+
+		// Simulate what the code does when constructing the callback
+		params := map[string]string{
+			model.SessionCookieToken: sessionToken,
+			model.SessionCookieCsrf:  csrfToken,
+			"srv":                    siteURL,
+		}
+
+		// Verify all expected parameters are present
+		assert.Equal(t, sessionToken, params[model.SessionCookieToken])
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, params[model.SessionCookieCsrf])
+		assert.Equal(t, siteURL, params["srv"])
+	})
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter detects server mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Scenario: The srv parameter from callback doesn't match expected server
+		// Mobile should detect the mismatch
+
+		expectedServer := "https://server-a.example.com"
+		actualSrvFromCallback := "https://server-b.example.com"
+
+		// This is the check that should happen in mobile
+		isMismatch := expectedServer != actualSrvFromCallback
+		assert.True(t, isMismatch, "Should detect server mismatch")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("srv parameter allows legitimate login", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Scenario: Normal login to legitimate server
+		// Server adds srv=server.com to callback
+		// Mobile verifies: expected == srv
+
+		expectedServer := "https://server.example.com"
+		actualSrvFromCallback := "https://server.example.com"
+
+		// This is the check that should happen in mobile
+		isLegitimate := expectedServer == actualSrvFromCallback
+		assert.True(t, isLegitimate, "Should allow legitimate login")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestCompleteSamlRelayState tests that relay state is properly handled
+func TestCompleteSamlRelayState(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("should decode relay state correctly", func(t *testing.T) {
+		relayProps := map[string]string{
+			"action":      model.OAuthActionMobile,
+			"redirect_to": "mmauth://callback",
+		}
+
+		relayState := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(model.MapToJSON(relayProps)))
+
+		// Decode and verify
+		decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(relayState)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		decodedProps := model.MapFromJSON(strings.NewReader(string(decoded)))
+		assert.Equal(t, model.OAuthActionMobile, decodedProps["action"])
+		assert.Equal(t, "mmauth://callback", decodedProps["redirect_to"])
+	})
+}

server/i18n/en.json

@@ -4254,6 +4254,10 @@
     "id": "api.user.login_ldap.not_available.app_error",
     "translation": "AD/LDAP not available on this server."
   },
+  {
+    "id": "api.user.login_sso_code_exchange.deprecated.app_error",
+    "translation": "This endpoint is deprecated and disabled. Please update your mobile app."
+  },
   {
     "id": "api.user.login_with_desktop_token.not_oauth_or_saml_user.app_error",
     "translation": "User is not an OAuth or SAML user."

server/public/model/feature_flags.go

@@ -71,7 +71,9 @@ type FeatureFlags struct {
 
 	ContentFlagging bool
 
-	// Enable mobile SSO SAML code-exchange flow (no tokens in deep links)
+	// DEPRECATED: Mobile SSO SAML code-exchange flow - disabled by default
+	// This feature is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
+	// Mobile clients should use the direct SSO callback flow with srv parameter verification.
 	MobileSSOCodeExchange bool
 }
 
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ func (f *FeatureFlags) SetDefaults() {
 	f.CustomProfileAttributes = true
 	f.AttributeBasedAccessControl = true
 	f.ContentFlagging = false
-	f.MobileSSOCodeExchange = true
+	f.MobileSSOCodeExchange = false
 }
 
 // ToMap returns the feature flags as a map[string]string