Cherry-pick MM-66789: Restrict log downloads to a root path for support packets (#35164)

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Этот коммит содержится в:
Doug Lauder
2026-02-02 14:23:28 -05:00
коммит произвёл GitHub
родитель d2594e5046
Коммит 463f7a0511
13 изменённых файлов: 1050 добавлений и 7 удалений

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@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ func TestGetMattermostLog(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, err)
})
// Set MM_LOG_PATH to allow log file reads from our temp directory
t.Setenv("MM_LOG_PATH", dir)
// Enable log file but point to an empty directory to get an error trying to read the file
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
*cfg.LogSettings.EnableFile = true
@@ -71,6 +74,33 @@ func TestGetMattermostLog(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, fileData)
assert.Equal(t, "mattermost.log", fileData.Filename)
assert.Positive(t, len(fileData.Body))
// Test path validation: FileLocation outside MM_LOG_PATH should be blocked
t.Run("path validation prevents reading files outside log directory", func(t *testing.T) {
// Create a directory outside the allowed log root
outsideDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "outside")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
err = os.RemoveAll(outsideDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
// Create a file that would be read if validation fails
outsideLogLocation := config.GetLogFileLocation(outsideDir)
err = os.WriteFile(outsideLogLocation, []byte("secret data"), 0644)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Set FileLocation to the outside directory (MM_LOG_PATH is still set to 'dir')
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
*cfg.LogSettings.FileLocation = outsideDir
})
// Should be blocked by path validation
fileData, err = th.Service.GetLogFile(th.Context)
assert.Nil(t, fileData)
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside allowed logging directory")
})
}
func TestGetNotificationLogFile(t *testing.T) {
@@ -91,10 +121,20 @@ func TestGetNotificationLogFile(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
// Disable file target before cleaning up to avoid a race between
// removing the directory and the file getting written again.
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
*cfg.NotificationLogSettings.EnableFile = false
})
th.Service.NotificationsLogger().Flush()
err = os.RemoveAll(dir)
assert.NoError(t, err)
})
// Set MM_LOG_PATH to allow log file reads from our temp directory
t.Setenv("MM_LOG_PATH", dir)
// Enable notifications file but point to an empty directory to get an error trying to read the file
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
*cfg.NotificationLogSettings.EnableFile = true
@@ -118,6 +158,33 @@ func TestGetNotificationLogFile(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, fileData)
assert.Equal(t, "notifications.log", fileData.Filename)
assert.Positive(t, len(fileData.Body))
// Test path validation: FileLocation outside MM_LOG_PATH should be blocked
t.Run("path validation prevents reading files outside log directory", func(t *testing.T) {
// Create a directory outside the allowed log root
outsideDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "outside")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
err = os.RemoveAll(outsideDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
// Create a file that would be read if validation fails
outsideLogLocation := config.GetNotificationsLogFileLocation(outsideDir)
err = os.WriteFile(outsideLogLocation, []byte("secret data"), 0644)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Set FileLocation to the outside directory (MM_LOG_PATH is still set to 'dir')
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(cfg *model.Config) {
*cfg.NotificationLogSettings.FileLocation = outsideDir
})
// Should be blocked by path validation
fileData, err = th.Service.GetNotificationLogFile(th.Context)
assert.Nil(t, fileData)
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside allowed logging directory")
})
}
func TestGetAdvancedLogs(t *testing.T) {
@@ -134,6 +201,9 @@ func TestGetAdvancedLogs(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
})
// Set MM_LOG_PATH to allow advanced logging to write to our temp directory
t.Setenv("MM_LOG_PATH", dir)
// Setup log files for each setting
optLDAP := map[string]string{
"filename": path.Join(dir, "ldap.log"),
@@ -243,9 +313,10 @@ func TestGetAdvancedLogs(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, notifFile)
testlib.AssertLog(t, bytes.NewBuffer(notifFile.Body), mlog.LvlInfo.Name, "Some Notification")
})
// Disable AdvancedLoggingJSON
// Disable AdvancedLoggingJSON for all log settings
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(c *model.Config) {
c.LogSettings.AdvancedLoggingJSON = nil
c.NotificationLogSettings.AdvancedLoggingJSON = nil
})
t.Run("No logs returned when AdvancedLoggingJSON is empty", func(t *testing.T) {
// Confirm no logs get returned
@@ -253,4 +324,119 @@ func TestGetAdvancedLogs(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, fileDatas, 0)
})
t.Run("path validation prevents reading files outside log directory", func(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temporary directory to use as the log root
logDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "logs")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
err = os.RemoveAll(logDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
// Set MM_LOG_PATH to restrict log file access to logDir
t.Setenv("MM_LOG_PATH", logDir)
// Create a file outside the log directory that should not be accessible
outsideDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "outside")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() {
err = os.RemoveAll(outsideDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
secretFile := path.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
err = os.WriteFile(secretFile, []byte("secret data"), 0644)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Create a valid log file inside the log directory
validLog := path.Join(logDir, "valid.log")
err = os.WriteFile(validLog, []byte("valid log data"), 0644)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test 1: Attempt to read file outside log directory using absolute path
optOutside := map[string]string{
"filename": secretFile,
}
dataOutside, err := json.Marshal(optOutside)
require.NoError(t, err)
logCfgOutside := mlog.LoggerConfiguration{
"malicious": mlog.TargetCfg{
Type: "file",
Format: "json",
Levels: []mlog.Level{mlog.LvlError},
Options: dataOutside,
},
}
logCfgDataOutside, err := json.Marshal(logCfgOutside)
require.NoError(t, err)
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(c *model.Config) {
c.LogSettings.AdvancedLoggingJSON = logCfgDataOutside
})
fileDatas, err := th.Service.GetAdvancedLogs(th.Context)
// Should return error indicating path is outside allowed directory
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside allowed logging directory")
require.Len(t, fileDatas, 0)
// Test 2: Attempt path traversal attack
traversalPath := path.Join(logDir, "..", "..", "etc", "passwd")
optTraversal := map[string]string{
"filename": traversalPath,
}
dataTraversal, err := json.Marshal(optTraversal)
require.NoError(t, err)
logCfgTraversal := mlog.LoggerConfiguration{
"traversal": mlog.TargetCfg{
Type: "file",
Format: "json",
Levels: []mlog.Level{mlog.LvlError},
Options: dataTraversal,
},
}
logCfgDataTraversal, err := json.Marshal(logCfgTraversal)
require.NoError(t, err)
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(c *model.Config) {
c.LogSettings.AdvancedLoggingJSON = logCfgDataTraversal
})
fileDatas, err = th.Service.GetAdvancedLogs(th.Context)
// Should return error for path traversal attempt
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside")
require.Len(t, fileDatas, 0)
// Test 3: Valid path within log directory should work
optValid := map[string]string{
"filename": validLog,
}
dataValid, err := json.Marshal(optValid)
require.NoError(t, err)
logCfgValid := mlog.LoggerConfiguration{
"valid": mlog.TargetCfg{
Type: "file",
Format: "json",
Levels: []mlog.Level{mlog.LvlError},
Options: dataValid,
},
}
logCfgDataValid, err := json.Marshal(logCfgValid)
require.NoError(t, err)
th.Service.UpdateConfig(func(c *model.Config) {
c.LogSettings.AdvancedLoggingJSON = logCfgDataValid
})
fileDatas, err = th.Service.GetAdvancedLogs(th.Context)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, fileDatas, 1)
require.Equal(t, "valid.log", fileDatas[0].Filename)
require.Equal(t, []byte("valid log data"), fileDatas[0].Body)
})
}